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ABSTRACT
Software verification has recently made enormous progress due
to the development of novel verification methods and the speed-
up of supporting technologies like SMT solving. To keep software
verification tools up to date with these advances, tool developers
keep on integrating newly designed methods into their tools, al-
most exclusively by re-implementing the method within their own
framework. While this allows for a conceptual re-use of methods,
it requires novel implementations for every new technique.
In this paper, we employ cooperative verification in order to avoid
re-implementation and enable usage of novel tools as black-box
components in verification. Specifically, cooperation is employed
for the core ingredient of software verification which is invariant
generation. Finding an adequate loop invariant is key to the success
of a verification run. Our framework named CoVerCIG allows a
master verification tool to delegate the task of invariant generation
to one or several specialized helper invariant generators. Their
results are then utilized within the verification run of the master
verifier, allowing in particular for crosschecking the validity of
the invariant. We experimentally evaluate our framework on an
instance with two masters and three different invariant generators
using a number of benchmarks from SV-COMP 2020. The experi-
ments show that the use of CoVerCIG can increase the number of
correctly verified tasks without increasing the used resources.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Recent years have seen a major progress in software verification
as for instance witnessed by the annual competition on software
verification SV-COMP [2]. This success is on the one hand due
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to advances in SAT and SMT solving and on the other hand due
to novel verification methods like interpolation in model check-
ing [37], automata-based software verification [31] or property
directed reachability [16]. Still, automatic verification remains a
complex and error-prone task. In particular, it is often the case that
one tool can verify a particular class of programs, but fails to verify
other classes (or even gives incorrect answers), whereas it is the
reverse situation for another tool. Moreover, to keep their tools up
to date with novel techniques, tool developers keep on integrating
them by re-implementation within their framework.
An approach for changing this unsatisfactory situation is co-
operative verification (for an overview see [13]). Cooperative ver-
ification builds on the idea of letting tools (and thus techniques)
cooperate on verification tasks, thereby leveraging the tool’s in-
dividual strengths. In particular, cooperative verification aims at
black box combinations of tools, using existing tools off-the-shelf
without re-implementation. While this sounds like a natural idea,
its realization poses a number of challenges, the major one being
the exchange and usage of analysis information. For cooperation,
tools are required to produce (partial) results which other tools can
understand and employ in their verification run. With conditional
model checking [7], the first proposal of an exchange format for
verification results was made. A conditional model checker outputs
its (potentially partial) result in the form of a condition which can
be read by other conditional model checkers in order to complete
the verification task. Since verification tools normally do not un-
derstand conditions, reducers [9, 23] have been proposed to bring
conditions back into a form understandable by verifiers, namely
into (residual) programs describing the so far unverified program
part. This allows the result of a conditional model checker to be
made usable by arbitrary other verifiers. A second type of exist-
ing result usage is the validation of tool’s results [4, 34], similar to
proof-carrying code [38]. Both of these types are sequential forms
of cooperation: a first verifier starts and a second verifier continues,
either by completing or by validating a first result.
In this paper, we propose CoVerCIG, a cooperation framework
which complements these existing approaches by a new type of
cooperation. Conceptually, this framework (depicted in Figure 1)
consists of a master verifier and a number of helper invariant gener-
ators. The master verifier has the overall control on the verification
process and can delegate tasks to helpers as well as continue its
own verification process with (partial) results provided by helpers.
The helpers run in parallel as black boxes without cooperation.
The task to be delegated is an integral part of software verification,
namely invariant generation. The framework allows cooperation
via outsourcing the task of invariant generation, leveraging the
strength of specialized invariant generation tools.
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Figure 1: Collective invariant generation
Like for other types of cooperation, the question of the exchange
format for results comes up. Here, we have chosen correctness wit-
nesses [3] for this purpose. Correctness witnesses are employed
in witness validation and certify a verifier’s result stating the cor-
rectness of a program. These witnesses are particularly well suited
for our intended usage, because their format is standardized and
a number of verifiers already produce correctness witnesses. To
account for the incooperation of helper verifiers not producing
witnesses, our framework also foresees the inclusion of adapters
transforming invariants into correctness witnesses. We provide an
implementation of two such adapters. Witnesses are then injected
into the verification run of the master. For stating the task to be
solved by invariant generators we furthermore require mappers
transforming program and property to be proven into a task format
understandable by the helper tools. Figure 1 depicts our framework
for collective invariant generation. The framework can be arbitrar-
ily configured with different masters and helpers, provided that
suitable adapters and mappers are given.
We have implemented our framework within the CPAchecker
framework [10] and have employed different configurations of it as
master verifier. As helper verifiers we have chosen publicly available
verification tools, some producing and one not producing witnesses.
We have then experimentally evaluated 14 different combinations
of master and helper on benchmarks of the annual competition
of software verification SV-COMP [2]. The experiments show an
improvement over the verification capabilities of the master tool,
without incurring significant overhead. In some cases, the verifica-
tion time is even decreased in cooperative verification.
Summarizing, we make the following contributions.
• We propose a framework for cooperative software verifi-
cation based on a master-helper architecture for collective
invariant generation.
• We construct 14 different instantiations of the framework us-
ing 2 masters and 3 helpers, running both helpers in isolation
as well as in parallel.
• For the inclusion of helper verifiers, we implement two
adapters, one transforming invariants expressed in the LLVM
IR language1 into correctness witnesses, the other modifying
a generated witness as to bring it into the right format.
1https://llvm.org/docs/LangRef.html
• We carry out an extensive experimental evaluation demon-
strating the effectiveness and efficiency of collective invari-
ant generation.
2 FUNDAMENTALS
We aim at the cooperative verification of programs written in GNU
C, focusing on the validation of safety properties. To be able to
define safety properties, a formal representation of programs as
well as their semantics is needed. Thus we next briefly introduce
the syntax and semantics of programs which we consider here.
We follow the notation of Beyer et al. [6] describing programs
as control-flow automata (CFAs). A CFA is basically a control-flow
graph with edges annotated with program statements. More for-
mally, a program is represented as a control-flow automaton
C = (L, l0,G), consisting of a set of program locations L, an ini-
tial location l0 ∈ L and the control-flow edges G,G ⊆ L ×Op × L.
The set Op contains all possible operations on integer variables2
present in the program, namely conditions (as of conditionals and
loops), assignments, method calls and return statements. Figure 2(a)
shows a C-program taken from the SV-COMP benchmarks3, and
Figure 2(b) its corresponding CFA. The program also contains a
special error label, used for encoding the property to be verified. The
verification task for this program is to show the non-reachability
of the error label at location 9, i.e., for our example program the
verifier has to prove that y equals n after the loop which is true
(since n is unsigned).
For the semantics, we start by defining program states. Let Var
denote the set of all integer variables occurring in programs, BExp
the set of boolean expressions and AExp the set of arithmetic ex-
pressions over Var . Then a state σ of the program is a mapping from
the variables to the integers, i.e., σ : Var → Z. We lift the mapping
to also contain the evaluation of arithmetic and boolean expressions
so that σ maps AExp to Z and BExp to B. A finite program path
π is a sequence of transitions ⟨σ0, l0⟩
д0→ ⟨σ1, l1⟩ · · ·
дn−1→ ⟨σn , ln⟩,
such that σ0 assigns 0 to all variables, ln is a leaf in the CFA and
(li ,дi , li+1) ∈ G holds for each transition ⟨σi , li ⟩
дi→ ⟨σi+1, li+1⟩ in
π . Infinite program paths are defined analogeously. As for state
changes in paths: If дi is a boolean expression, method call or return
statement, then σi = σi+1 holds. If дi is an assignment x = a, where
a ∈ AExp, then σi+1 = σi [x 7→ σi (a)]. Finally, we denote all paths
of a program represented by a CFA C by paths(C).
Here, we are interested in verifying safety properties of programs
given as CFAs. For the purpose of this paper, we define a safety
property P as a pair of a location ℓ ∈ L and a boolean condition
φ ∈ BExp. There can be multiple safety properties required to hold
in a program. For our example program of Figure 2 the property is
(8,n = y). For the verifier this is encoded in the form
8: if (!(n==y))
9: Error: return 1;
Later, we will see that different verifers require different encodings
of the property to be checked, and hencemappers need to be applied
to translate property encodings.
2In our formalization, we use integer variables only, the implementation covers C
programs.
3https://github.com/sosy-lab/sv-benchmarks
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1 int main() {
2 unsigned int n = nondet();
3 unsigned int x = n, y = 0;
4 while(x > 0){
5 x--;
6 y++; }
7 // Safety property
8 if (!(n == y)) {
9 Error: return 1; }
10 return 0;
11 }
(a) C code example
1start
2
3
4
5
6
8
911
12 10
n=nondet()
x=n
y=0
¬ (x>0)
(x>0)
x- -
y++
n==y ¬ (n==y)
ret 0 ret1
(b) The corresponding CFA
q1start
q2
q3
q4
q5
q6 q7
n == x+y
1,enterFunc
3,enterLoopHead
4,else
4,then6,enterLoopHead
7,then 7,else
o/w
o/w
o/w
o/w
o/w
o/w o/w
(c) Part of the witness
Figure 2: An example program, its control flow automaton and one witness
<node id="q3">
<data key=" invariant ">n == x+y</data>
<data key=" invariant . scope">main</data>
</node>
<edge source="q2" target ="q3">
<data key="enterLoopHead">true</data>
<data key=" startline ">3</data>
<data key="endline">3</data>
...
</edge>
Figure 3: Excerpt of a correctness witness for the example
A CFA (or program) C violates a safety property P = (ℓ,φ) when
the program reaches location ℓ in a state which does not satisfy φ.
More formally, P is violated byC , if there is some path π ∈ paths(C),
π = ⟨σ0, l0⟩
д0→ ⟨σ1, l1⟩ · · ·
дn−1→ ⟨σn , ln⟩ and some i , 0 ≤ i ≤ n, such
that ℓi = ℓ and σi (φ) = false.
Cooperatively verifying safety of programs is achieved in our
framework via collective (loop) invariant generation. Syntactically,
a loop invariant is a boolean expression associated to a loop head. A
loop invariant needs to hold (1) before the first loop execution and
(2) after each loop execution. The expression n = x +y, for instance,
is a loop invariant for the program in Figure 2(a), associated to the
loop head at location 4. This loop invariant facilitates verification of
the safety property, because in conjunction with the negated loop
condition and information about initial variable values it ensures n
to be equal to y after the loop. Other valid loop invariants would
be x ≥ 0, n = 3 ⇒ y ≤ 5 or true, which however all do not help in
proving the safety property. Especially the loop invariant true does
not provide any information, as it always is a valid loop invariant.
Thus, we call it a trivial invariant.
As stated before, we chose witnesses (more specifically, correct-
ness witnesses) as exchange format during collective invariant
generation. Formally, a witness is a finite state automaton in which
transitions are labelled with so called source code guards and states
can be equipped with boolean expressions. When all these boolean
expressions are either true or false, we call thewitness trivial. Source
code guards are of the form location,type where type can be
then, else, enterFunc and enterLoopHead. The guard o/w (other-
wise) is used if a source code line does not match the other guards
present. Via these labels we can match transitions of the automaton
with edges in the CFA.
In Figure 2(c), we see a correctness witness for our example pro-
gram. State q3 is reached by transitions labelled 3,enterLoopHead
or 6,enterLoopHead and thus corresponds to the loop head at pro-
gram location 4. Associated with this state is the invariant n = x +y.
Syntactically, correctness witnesses are stored in an XML format
and consist of two parts: (1) general information like the producer
of the witness or the program associated with the witness, and
(2) a GraphML representation of the witness automaton. Figure 3
shows an excerpt of this format for the witness in Figure 2(c). More
information and a formal specification of correctness witnesses can
be found in [3].
3 CONCEPT
In this section, we introduce our novel concept of Cooperative
Verification viaCollective InvariantGeneration (CoVerCIG), shown
in Figure 1. The framework contains two sorts of main components:
Master verifiers (one) and helper invariant generators (several).
Next, we state some requirements on and explain the functionality
of these components as well as their cooperation.
3.1 Components of the CoVerCIG-Framework
The most important component of the framework is the master
verifier, which we build out of an existing verifier. The master
is responsible for coordinating the verification process and can,
if needed, request support from the second type of components,
the helpers, in the form of invariants as described by correctness
witnesses. Hence, the master is also steering the cooperation.
In the following, we explain the two sorts of main components
in more detail:
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Figure 4: Workflow of an adapter
Master Verifier A master verifier gets as input the program
C as CFA and a safety property P . It computes as output a
boolean answer b, stating whether the property holds, and
possibly (but not necessarily) provides an overall witness
ω. To be able to process the provided support in form of
invariants stored inside of correctness witnesses, a master is
required to implement an internal function called injectWit-
ness. The function loads a witness, extracts the invariants
present in it and injects them into the analysis of the mas-
ter verifier. The witness injection can either happen before
(re-)starting the analysis or during runtime. We exemplify
the realization of witness injection later.
Helper Invariant Generator A helper invariant generator
gets as input the program C as CFA and a safety property
P . It computes as output a set of invariants, stored in a ver-
ification witness ω ′. The generated invariants are neither
required to be helpful for the master verifier nor to be correct.
Thus, helper invariant generators are also allowed to gen-
erate trivial invariants or invariant candidates which might
turn out to be wrong.
We cannot expect existing verification tools which we wish to use
as helpers to be able to work on CFAs, to understand the safety
property or to produce witnesses. Hence, we foresee two further
sorts of components in our framework:
Mapper A mapper transforms the safety property specifica-
tion inside the program into the desired input format of the
helper. A mapper basically conducts some simple syntac-
tic code replacements. For instance, for our running exam-
ple some helpers might instead require the safety property
to be written as if(!(n==y)){verifier_error();} or
assert(n==y);
Adapter An adapter generates a correctness witness out of
the computed loop invariants of a helper. Furthermore, some
helper invariant generators work on intermediate represen-
tations (IR) of the C-language (e.g. LLVM) or intermediate
verification languages (e.g. Boogie). In this case, the com-
puted invariants (formulated in terms of IR-variables) first
of all need to be translated back to the namespace of the
C-program.
The latter transformations happening inside an adapter are shown
in Figure 4. Initially, the IR-language variables present in the in-
variants are translated to variables present in the C-program. After
that, we transform their IR-code locations back to C-code locations.
For this, many compilers offer debug flags, adding this informa-
tion to the IR. Otherwise, building and matching the CFAs of the
C-program and the IR-program is required. Finally, the pairs of
mapped location and invariant are stored in the form of a witness,
constructable from the CFA.
Table 1: Overview of the configuration options available
Name Description Values
restartMaster restart the master after
invariant generation
boolean
termAfterFirstInv use first witness only boolean
timerM maximum time for master
until requestsForHelp is
send
time in s
timeoutH maximum time for helpers
to generate an invariant
time in s
3.2 Cooperation within CoVerCIG
After having explained the individual components, we define their
interaction in the framework. In this paper, we focus on the paral-
lel execution of several helpers which implement complementary
approaches so that we can leverage their individual strengths. Al-
gorithm 1 describes the form of cooperation. It is steered by several
user configurable options which fix aspects like time and resource
limits of master and helpers. Table 1 summarizes the configuration
options. We next describe them in detail.
Master options The following aspects of the master’s behav-
ior need to be fixed: First, when to delegate tasks to helpers,
and second, how to continue the verification process after
invariant generation. For the delegation, we let the master
verifier run until it requests support, which can be checked
by inspecting the master’s flag requestsForHelp. The mas-
ter gets a configurable timelimit (called timerM) after which
it is expected to send this request. By adding such an explicit
request for help, we allow the master to send a request for
other reasons (besides the timer) in the future. Then, after in-
variant generation, the master can either be freshly restarted
or continued (option restartMaster).
Helper option When at least two helpers run in parallel, even-
tually one of them first computes a witness. We can then
either (1) directly stop the other helpers, or (2) wait for all
to complete before injecting witnesses into the master. This
option is called termAfterFirstInv.
Timeouts Finally, similar to the master, we can set a specific
timeout for the helpers which fixes how long they are al-
lowed to try to generate invariants. The timeout option is
called timeoutH.
Next, we explain the CoVerCIG algorithm shown in Algorithm 1 in
detail. We assume that master and helpers run as threads and can
be started and stopped. We furthermore employ methods wait for
waiting until some condition is achieved and join for waiting for
a specific thread to complete.
Initially, the master verifier is started without any helper invari-
ant generators running in parallel (line 1), providing the oppor-
tunity to verify programs on its own. It runs standalone until it
requests for help (either due to not being able to solve the problem
alone or due to hitting its timer) or it computes a result which is
subsequently returned (line 3). Afterwards all helpers are started in
parallel (lines 5 and 6). They also run until they reach their timeout,
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Algorithm 1 CoVerCIG-algorithm
Input: C ▷ CFA
P ▷ safety property
M ▷ master
Helpers ▷ set of helpers
conf ▷ configuration
Output: ω ▷ witness
b ▷ result
1: M.start(C, P, conf.timerM);
2: wait until (M.requestsForHelp ∨M.hasSolution());
3: if (M.hasSolution()) then
4: returnM.getSolution();
5: for each H ∈ Helpers do parallel ▷ run helpers in parallel
6: H.start(C, P, conf.timeoutH);
7: wait until (H.timedout() ∨ H.hasSolution() ∨ H.stopped());
8: if (H.hasSolution() ∧ nonTrivial(H.getSolution())) then
9: witnesses := witnesses ∪ H.getSolution();
10: if (conf.termAfterFirstInv) then
11: for each H’ ∈ helpers \{ H } do parallel
12: H’.stop(); ▷ stop other helpers
13: if (M.hasSolution()) then
14: returnM.getSolution();
15: if (witnesses , ∅) then ▷ invariants found
16: if (conf.restartMaster) then
17: M.stop();
18: M.inject(witnesses); ▷ inject witnesses into master
19: if (conf.restartMaster) then
20: M.start(C,P,∞);
21: join(M); ▷ wait for M to finish
22: returnM.getSolution();
a solution is found or they are stopped. Their solutions (invari-
ants) are inserted into the witness set (line 9). Depending on op-
tion termAfterFirstInv, either all but the first finished helper are
stopped or it is waited until all helpers either computed a solution or
ran into their timeout. If invariants (witnesses) have been computed,
these are injected into the master (line 18). If the restartMaster
option is set, the master needs to be stopped before injection and
restarted afterwards. Then the master continues and completes its
verification (without any further request for help) and the result is
finally returned.
Example 3.1. To explain the framework’s functionality, we de-
monstrate the CoVerCIG algorithm on the example presented in
Figure 2(a). Assume that we instantiate the framework with a mas-
ter verifier and four helper invariant generators4. Moreover, we
configure the framework as follows:
• restartMaster = true,
• terminateAfterFirstInv = false,
• timerM = 50s, timeoutH = 300s.
Initially, the master verifier runs standalone and after 50 seconds
runtime it requests help. This means that it cannot generate the
invariant n = x + y, for example because it rather proves single
4Later, we will see that more than two helpers does not practically make sense.
program traces safe. The master verifier would then run in parallel
with the four helper invariant generators being called. Let us assume
that the first helper returns only trivial invariants (after 10s), the
second one an invariantn ≥ y (after 50s), the third one the invariant
n = x +y (after 100s) and the fourth the invariant n−x −y = 0 (after
500s). The trivial invariant is ignored (see check in line 8) and when
the second helper returns a solution, the third and fourth helper are
still not stopped, due to the chosen configuration. The algorithm
waits until the third helper computes the invariant and the fourth
(only being able to compute an invariant after 500s) hits the timeout.
Then the master is stopped, the invariants n ≥ y and n = x + y are
injected and the master is restarted. The master verifier can use
both invariants and might now compute the correct result.
4 IMPLEMENTATION
To be able to evaluate the performance of our framework CoVer-
CIG, we instantiated it with two different master verifiers and three
helpers, using existing off-the-shelf invariant generation tools. As
verifiers need to be extended with witness injection for being able
to act as a master, we used the open-source configurable program
analysis framework CPAchecker [10] for this purpose and em-
ployed two of its standard instantiations (predicate abstraction and
k-induction). We also decided to implement Algorithm 1 within
CPAchecker. For the helper invariant generators – which can be
used off-the-shelf – we looked at current and past participants of
the annual competition of software verification SV-COMP [2]. Our
intention was to find tools which provide complementary tech-
niques for invariant generation. To this end, we chose the tools
SeaHorn [28], UltimateAutomizer [29] and VeriAbs [1]. All
helper invariant generators are used as black-boxes. An overview
of the techniques employed in these tools is given in Table 2. The
table also states whether the helpers require mappers and adapters.
A more detailed explanation is given next.
4.1 Master Verifiers
Predicate Abstraction. The first analysis used as master is a pred-
icate abstraction technique [11], conducting predicate refinement
using a CEGAR (counter example guided abstraction refinement)
scheme [20] with lazy-abstraction [33] and Craig interpolation [32].
Loop heads and error locations are used as locations where abstrac-
tions are computed; the computation of the abstraction itself is
done using an SMT solver.
Witness Injection: For using this technique as master, we extended
it with witness injection. The purpose of witness injection is the
use of the invariants as given in the witnesses in the running anal-
ysis of the master. It is realized by extracting predicates from the
invariants and inserting them into the set of available predicates as
maintained by the analysis. If these predicates contain conjunctions
of clauses, these are furthermore split up and inserted individually.
Splitting predicates increases the performance due to the fact that
SMT solvers perform better on many small predicates than on few
larger ones5.
k-Induction. The basic idea of k-induction [25] is to generalize
bounded model checking (BMC) [14] via induction. After proving
k-bounded program executions safe using BMC, a generalization
5This has been reported by tool developers and has also shown in our experiments.
Haltermann and Wehrheim
Table 2: Summary of tools used as helpers
Tool Techniques Mapper Adapter
SeaHorn generation and solving of constrained horn clauses ✘ ✔
UltimateAutomizer predicate abstraction, automata, path-based refinement ✘ (✔)
VeriAbs portfolio of 4 different sequential compositions ✘ ✘
is aimed for. The applied technique therefore generates auxiliary
invariants that are continuously refined using a CEGAR based
analysis [5]. These invariants are combined with the information
generated by BMC and generalized to a safety proof by successfully
conducting an induction step.
Witness Injection: We also implemented a method for witness injec-
tion for k-induction.Witness injection before restarting the analysis
is conducted by proving correctness of witnesses and afterwards
adding them to the set of invariants maintained by the analysis. For
injecting witness into a running analysis, we periodically check
whether new witnesses are available before each induction step. If
so, we also check their validity and add them to the set of invariants.
4.2 Helper Invariant Generators
We have chosen the existing verification tools SeaHorn, Ulti-
mateAutomizer and VeriAbs as helper invariant generators. For
this choice, we have inspected the tools participating in the annual
competition on software verification. UltimateAutomizer has
achieved excellent results in this year’s SV-COMP by taking the sec-
ond place in the category ”Overall”. Since we already use two main
components of CPAchecker, the winner in the category ”Overall”
this year, inside the masters, we did not also take instantiations of
CPAchecker as helpers into account. Moreover, we have chosen
VeriAbs, the winning tool in SV-COMP 2020 on ”ReachSafety”,
the category dealing with safety properties. As third tool we use
SeaHorn, a verification tool based on constrained Horn Clauses,
neither currently participating in the SV-COMP nor producing wit-
nesses. The three helper invariant generators employ verification
techniques complementary to those of both the other helpers and
the two masters.
SeaHorn. SeaHorn [28] is a verification tool using Constrained
Horn Clauses (CHCs) to solve the verification tasks. SeaHorn con-
structs CHCs for each statement, encoding both data and control
dependencies as well as the safety property. The (recursive) system
of CHC is solved using the solver Spacer [36]. Spacer tries to prove
the unsatisfiability of the CHCs, being equivalent to proving the
program safe, by searching for interpretations of the predicates
present in the CHCs. SeaHorn operates on the LLVM intermediate
representation. We choose SeaHorn to extend the stack of helpers
by a tool being conceptually complementary to the others.
Adapter for SeaHorn. SeaHorn participated in the SV-COMP
2015, thus it can process the encoding of safety properties used in
our evaluation. Unfortunately, it only returns a boolean answer and
no verification witnesses, hence we had to implement an adapter
for it. Our adapter follows the general construction explained in
Figure 4 and we exemplify its translation in Example 4.1.
Example 4.1. SeaHorn associates invariants to LLVMbasic blocks.
A basic block6 is a code fragment having a single entry location
(the first) and a single exit location (in general the last location
of the block). We obtain the computed invariants in LLVM and
the corresponding basic blocks by using the launch parameter
−−show-invars. To construct a witness containing them, we need
to translate the invariants and find the matching C-code location for
the basic block. For both, we use the LLVM-IR equipped with debug
information, using SeaHornwith launch parameter -g . Thereby,
we obtain the IR-code fragment of the program in Figure 2(a), shown
in simplified form and containing the most important debug in-
formation as comments. The example contains two Basic Blocks,
entry and _bb.
1 entry:
2 v1 = bitcast i32 (...)* @nondet to i32 ()* ▷n
3 v2 = icmp eq i32 v1, 0
4 br i1 v2, label %error, label %_bb
5
6 _bb:
7 v3 = phi i32 [0, %entry], [v6, %_bb] ▷y
8 v4 = phi i32 [v1, %entry], [v5, %_bb] ▷x
9 v5 = add i32 v4, -1
10 v6 = add i32 v3, 1
11 v7 = icmp eq i32 v5, 0
12 br i1 v7, label %error, label %_bb ▷line 4
13 · · ·
SeaHorn computes the invariant v1 − v4 − v3 = 0 for the exam-
ple and associates it with the basic block _bb. At first, we need
to transform the variables from the IR to C-variables occurring in
the program. In this example we can use the debug information,
as shown in comments in the code. In general, a more sophisti-
cated procedure is needed since LLVM-IR uses a three address code.
Therein, complex expressions are split into several statements using
intermediate variables which are resolved to C-expressions.
Afterwards, the transformed invariant needs to be associated
with the correct location in the C-code. We analyze the LLVM IR
program structure to map the basic blocks back to C-locations. In
the example, the block _bb is identified as being the loop of the
program, thus the invariant is mapped to the loop head. For this,
we employed some basic functions provided by PHASAR [42] in
our adapter. Finally, we construct the CFA of the C-program, store
the invariants at the nodes and convert the equipped CFA to a
verification witness.
6https://releases.llvm.org/5.0.0/docs/LangRef.html#functions
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UltimateAutomizer.UltimateAutomizer’s verification tech-
nique is based on predicate abstraction and on automata construc-
tions [29–31]. The program is represented as finite automaton and
error labels are final states. UltimateAutomizer then aims at prov-
ing emptiness of the accepted language of the automaton which is
equivalent to proving safety of the program. AlthoughUltimateAu-
tomizer produces verification witnesses, we added an adapter for
the witnesses due to currently existing technical incompatibilities.
VeriAbs. VeriAbs is using a portfolio of four different verifi-
cation techniques, each containing several sequentially composed
components [1]. The selection of strategies (techniques) from the
portfolio is performed by analyzing the loop structure and intervals
for variables used in the loop. Depending on the analysis result, one
of the following four techniques is applied: (1) random fuzz testing,
(2) techniques to abstract arrays and apply BMC afterwards, (3)
explicit state model checking followed by standalone invariant gen-
eration techniques or (4) a fixed sequence of different verification
approaches.
5 EVALUATION
In the following, we evaluate different instantiations of CoVerCIG.
We focus on both effectiveness and efficiency, generally aiming at
checking whether the use of CoVerCIG can increase the number of
correctly solved verification tasks within the same resource limits.
5.1 Research Questions
We start with the feasibility of the approach in general.
Feasibility hypothesis: A framework for collective invariant
generation can be constructed using existing tools by building
adapters when needed. Evaluation plan: We construct instances
of the framework, using instances of predicate abstraction and k-
induction as master verifier and using three off-the-shelf helper
invariant generator. As a result, we obtain 14 different combinations.
Besides feasibility, we were interested in the following four re-
search questions.
RQ1. Can collective invariant generation increase the effective-
ness of the master verifier? Evaluation plan:We let the frame-
work run with a single invariant generator and compare the
results to a run where the master verifier runs standalone.
RQ2. Does cooperation impact the overall efficiency of the
verification? Evaluation plan: We compare the run time of
CoVerCIG with one helper against the two master verifiers
running standalone.
RQ3. What is an appropriate time for the master to run before
requesting for help? Evaluation plan: We run CoVerCIG in
combination with one helper, evaluating the effectiveness of
requesting for help after 50, 100 and 200 seconds.
RQ4. Does it pay off to run two invariant generators in par-
allel? Evaluation plan: We let the framework run with two
invariant generators and compare the results to a run, where
only a single invariant generator is used. Moreover, we com-
pare the two configurations for termAfterFirstInv and
evaluate timeouts for helpers using 100s and 200s.
5.2 Experimental Setup
Tools.We based the implemented of our CoVerCIG algorithm on
the CPAchecker7 1.9.1 (8646a85) using MathSat58 as solver within
CPAchecker. For the helper VeriAbs and UltimateAutomizer
we used the versions as used in the SV-COMP 20209. Due to the fact
that there is no precompiled binary of SeaHorn, we employ the
docker container of the latest version10. All three helper invariant
generators are used in their default configuration.
During evaluation, we used the following default configurations
for our framework:We set termAfterFirstInv and restartMaster
to true, setting the timerM to 50s and the timeoutH to 300s. Themas-
ter and helper used in a specific configuration as well as changes
made to the default configurations are denoted as follows: The
configuration kInd-ua-va-100-wait-200 denotes a configuration
using k-induction as master and the helpers UltimateAutomizer
and VeriAbs. The timerM is set to 100s, termAfterFirstInv to
false and timeoutH to 200s. In general, we will use the abbrevia-
tions SH for SeaHorn, UA for UltimateAutomizer and VA for
VeriAbs.
Verification Tasks. The verification tasks used are taken from
the set of SV-COMP 2020 benchmarks11. As we are interested in
finding suitable loop invariants, we selected all tasks from the
category ReachSafety-Loops. To obtain a more broad distribution of
tasks, we randomly selected 55 additional tasks from the categories
ProductLines, Recursive, Sequentialized, ECA, Floats and Heap,
yielding in total 342 tasks.
Computing Resources.We conducted the evaluation on three
virtual machines, each having an Intel Xeon E5-2695 v4 CPU with
eight cores and a frequency of 2.10 GHz and 16GBmemory, running
an Ubuntu 18.04 LTS with Linux Kernel 4.15. We run our experi-
ments using the same setting as in the SV-COMP, giving each task 15
minutes of CPU-time on 8 cores and 15GB ormemory.We employed
Benchexec thereby guaranteeing the resource-limitations [12]. All
experimental data are available12.
5.3 Experimental Results
Feasibility hypothesis. We implemented the CoVerCIG-frame-
work as proof-of-concept in the CPAchecker-framework. For this,
we had to extend the existing implementations of k-induction and
predicate abstraction with witness injection. For the helper in-
variant generators we did not change a single line of code, only
adding adapters for SeaHorn and UltimateAutomizer. Integrat-
ing helpers like VeriAbs, not requiring an adapter or a mapper,
can be done within a few lines of code. Although the implementa-
tion is a proof-of-concept, this shows that the presented framework
works in practice and is applicable to all kinds of off-the-shelf helper
invariant generators, those producing verification witnesses and
those generating invariants in IR.
RQ1 (Effectiveness). To evaluate whether a master verifier
benefits from the support of a helper, we execute a combination
of a master and a helper in the default configuration and compare
7https://github.com/sosy-lab/cpachecker
8https://mathsat.fbk.eu/
9https://gitlab.com/sosy-lab/sv-comp/archives-2020/tree/master/2020
10suggested by the developers; used docker seahorn/seahorn-llvm5 (4c01c1d)
11https://github.com/sosy-lab/sv-benchmarks/releases/tag/svcomp20
12https://covercig.github.io/
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Figure 5: Quantile plots for CoVerCIG using both masters and different single helpers.
Table 3: Comparison of the two master verifiers running
standalone and using a single helper.
Tool- correct additional
Combination overall true false true false
k-induction 146 102 44 - -
kInd-SH-50 148 104 44 +3 0
kInd-UA-50 158 114 44 +13 0
kInd-VA-50 163 119 44 +19 0
pred abstr. 116 78 38 - -
pred-SH-50 122 84 38 +6 0
pred-UA-50 132 94 38 +16 0
pred-VA-50 125 87 38 +9 0
it to the master running standalone. Here, we are interested in
the number of correct verification results, i.e., the verifier correctly
reporting the safety property to be fulfilled (result true) or not
(result false). Running standalone, k-induction can correctly solve
146 of the verification tasks, predicate abstraction 116.
Table 3 gives the results of this experiment. In the table we see
the overall number of correct results, the number of correct true
and correct false results plus the the number of tasks additionally
solved when using a helper. Through the cooperative invariant gen-
eration, the performance of both masters is increased. As expected,
this applies to verification tasks with fulfilled safety property only,
i.e., the invariant generators can help in proving a property to
hold, but cannot help in refuting properties (as they correctly do
not generate invariants in these cases). Besides the additionally
solved tasks, there is also one (for SH and UA) and two (for VA)
tasks, respectively, which cannot be correctly solved anymore. In
these cases, the master alone consumes nearly all of the CPU time
available, hence sharing resources in cooperation with the helpers
results in a timeout.
On our data set, the total number of correctly solved tasks
increases using CoVerCIG by 12% for k-induction and 14% for
predicate abstraction used as master.
RQ2 (Efficiency). Next, we evaluate the efficiency of CoVerCIG,
analyzing the CPU-time spend solving the verification tasks. As
CoVerCIG eventually shares the CPU time between master and
helpers, we expect that more time is needed to compute a correct
result after the helper is started.
Figure 5 shows two quantile plots of the verification runs, the left
with k-induction and the right with predicate abstraction as master.
A datapoint (x ,y) in the plot means that the verifier computes the
x-fastest correct results (for a task) in at maximal y seconds. As
CoVerCIG instances behave like masters standalone in the first 50
seconds, we only show results not solved within these 50 seconds.
We see that for tasks requiring a low amount of time, all instances
(including the master alone) require a similar amount of CPU time.
For tasks requiring more time, CoVerCIG is actually often faster,
the extreme being predicate abstraction as master which alone is
unable to solve more difficult tasks in the given time.
We exemplarily also compared the CPU time of k-induction
standalone with CoVerCIG using VeriAbs as helper per task. It
turns out that sharing does only slightly impact the runtime, as
shown in Figure 6. The scatter plot compares the CPU time of
k-induction standalone as master and k-induction supported by
VeriAbs, in case both tools solved the task correctly. A datapoint
(x ,y) means that k-induction standalone takes x seconds to solve
the task and in combination with VeriAbs y seconds. The red
dashed box contains all tasks solved within 50 seconds, where both
tools behave equally, since the master does not request for help
in these cases. We see some tasks for which helping increased the
runtime, but also some for which it decreased it. In most of the
cases, the CPU time used by CoVerCIG is not significantly higher.
Finally, we compare the average CPU time needed to correctly
solve a task. Table 4 shows the average time needed for all tasks
and – in brackets – for the correctly solved tasks only. We observe
that the runtime increases when only looking at correctly solved
tasks (in particular for VeriAbs), however, when considering all
tasks the CPU time is even decreased. The latter effect is due to the
number of timeouts of the master decreasing when cooperating
with helpers. Concluding, we can make the following observation.
13Due to possible imprecisely measured CPU time of Benchexec, we computed an
upper bound on the runtime.
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Table 4: Total CPU time for all tasks and average CPU time
taken for a correct answer in brackets, both in seconds.
Master Master
standalone +SH13 +UA +VA
kInd 491 (50) 489 (63) 477 (68) 482 (107)
Pred 479 (30) 468 (39) 454 (51) 470 (49)
Table 5: Number of correctly verified tasks for different pa-
rameters of timerM
Value k-induction predicate abstr.
timerM -SH -UA -VA -SH -UA -VA
50s 148 158 163 122 132 125
100s 148 157 161 122 132 125
200s 148 157 156 122 132 125
On our dataset, collaborative invariant generation does not
negatively impact the effectiveness; in some cases we even see
small improvements.
RQ3 (Time for the Master to request for help). To deter-
mine a preferable time for the master to run alone, we evaluated
CoVerCIG using 50, 100 or 200 seconds for timerM. A summary of
the results is given in Table 5, showing the number of correctly
solved tasks for each instantiation. Both masters achieve their best
result running alone for 50 seconds. For k-induction, a good choice
for timerM plays an important role for its performance. In contrast,
the results of predicate abstraction are not influenced by different
values for timerM at all, because predicate abstraction computes its
correctly given answers on average in 19 seconds after obtaining
the invariants by the helpers. When using k-induction, we observe
cases where the correct solution is computed only if the master
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Figure 7: Tasks additionally solved using single helpers
sends the request early. Asking later sometimes leads to a situation
where the invariant is obtained too late to be helpful. Hence, we
employed 50 seconds in our default configuration which we used
to evaluate RQ1 and RQ2.
On our dataset, CoVerCIG performs best when requesting early
for help, using 50 seconds for timerM.
RQ4 (Combination of helpers). In RQ4, we were interested
in finding out (a) whether it is beneficial to run two invariant
generators in parallel, and (b) if yes, which pair is best for this.
To this end, we first of all determinedwhich helper is able to solve
which of the additionally solved tasks. The result is shown in the
Venn diagrams of Figure 7. Surprisingly, SeaHorn – although em-
ploying a technique conceptually different to UltimateAutomizer
and VeriAbs – is not able to solve a single task which not at least
one of the others can.
Next, we thus studied the number of correctly solved tasks using
the three possible pairs of helpers, running the two helpers in a pair
in parallel. Table 6 in the first row shows the results. It in addition
also contains results evaluating two values (100 and 200 seconds)
for parameter timeoutH in a setting when the master waits for all
helpers to complete (not just the first one). A first observation is
that – except for the case of k-induction with UA-VA – the results
show no significant difference when using the default configuration
or wait-100 or wait-200.
For checking whether parallel execution of helpers is beneficial,
these numbers need to be compared against those for a single
helper as given in Table 3. We see that predicate abstraction benefits
from using two helpers, especially using UltimateAutomizer and
VeriAbs. Using CoVerCIG with these tools perfectly combines their
strengths, thereby increasing the number of correctly solved tasks
in total by 17%. In contrast, it turns out that for k-induction none
of the combinations of two helpers outperforms CoVerCIG using
VeriAbs only. For UltimateAutomizer and VeriAbs as helpers,
the total number does not change, only the set of solved tasks. For
instance, nearly 50% of the additional tasks solved by kind-UA-VA
are not solved using kInd-UA and vice versa. This result is based
on the fact that they have to share the available CPU time in the
combination. Hence, tasks that are solved using one of them as
helper alone could not be solved anymore in a combination because
of timeouts. This phenomenon is even more an issue when running
all three helpers in parallel. The combination of all three helpers
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Table 6: Number of correctly solved tasks using different
forms of cooperation with two helpers running in parallel.
Config k-induction predicate abstr.
SH-
UA
SH-
VA
UA-
VA
SH-
UA
SH-
VA
UA-
VA
default 153 156 163 130 130 136
wait-100 156 155 161 132 131 136
wait-200 155 156 155 132 129 135
solves only 154 tasks correctly for k-induction and 129 for predicate
abstraction.
On our dataset, CoVerCIG can increase the total number of
correctly solved tasks using UA and VA in parallel; in general
waiting for the other tool to also finish its computation does
not pay off.
5.4 Threads to Validity
We have conducted our evaluation using a random sample of tasks
as well as those in the category Loops. Although this guarantees
some diversity in the chosen tasks, our findings may not completely
carry over to arbitrary real-world programs.
The experiments are conducted using the reliable framework
Benchexec on identical machines with same resource limitations,
guaranteeing comparable results. As SeaHorn is used within a
docker-container, its CPU usage however cannot be measured
by Benchexec. We therefore measured its CPU usage externally,
rounded it up and added it to the measured CPU time, obtaining a
lower bound for the correctly solved tasks. Thereby, all results stay
valid, especially of the best performing instantiations of CoVerCIG,
as they do not use SeaHorn.
Our implementation of CoVerCIG relies on the correctness of the
used master verifiers and helpers (which are given) as well as on
the adapters (which we build). An incorrectly translated invariant
may however influence the performance only negatively.
Both master verifiers used as well as UltimateAutomizer and
VeriAbs are participating in the annual SV-COMP, hence they
might be tuned to the tasks employed. This does however not
influence the validity of the results since our interest is in the
additional number of tasks solved by cooperation, not the solved
ones per se.
6 RELATEDWORK
In this paper, we presented a framework for cooperative verification
via collective invariant generation. The idea of collaboration for
verification by combining known techniques has been widely em-
ployed before. For instance, there are combinations of verification
with testing approaches [18, 19, 21, 22, 24, 26] and with approaches
for invariant generation [15, 17, 27, 40, 41]. The latter combina-
tions are conducted in a white box manner using strong coupling
between the components, making the addition of a new approach
a challenging task. Our framework conceptually decouples the in-
variant generation from the verification, making it more flexible.
In addition, using a black box integration with defined exchange
formats allows us to easily exchange or integrate new approaches.
There are also existing concepts for collaboration between differ-
ent techniques in a black-box manner. Conditional model checking
is a technique for sequentially composing different model checkers,
sharing information between the tools in form of conditions [7].
Beyer and Jakobs developed a concept for combining model check-
ing with testing [8]. Although both approaches enable cooperation,
none combines a verification tool and tools for invariant generation.
We next shortly discuss three approaches which are conceptually
closer to our framework. Frama-C is a framework for code analysis,
aiming for analyzing industrial size code [35]. The framework con-
tains different plugins, each implementing a verification or testing
technique. The plugins can exchange information in form of ASCL
source code annotations. Within Frama-C, the analyzers can col-
laborate by being either sequentially or parallelly composed. For
this, partial results produced by an analysis can be completed by a
second one or several partial results computed in parallel are com-
posed to a complete result. Frama-C offers the general possibility
to define cooperation between existing plugins. To the best of our
knowledge, Frama-C does however not provide a conceptual collab-
oration of a verification approach and tools for invariant generation
driven by the verification approach’s demand for support.
The approach of using continuously refined invariants for k-
induction [5] uses a lightweight dataflow analysis which can be
considered to be a helper for verification. Therein, the supporting
invariant generator runs in parallel to the k-induction analysis.
Compared to our framework, the main difference is the form of
cooperation used. Beyer et al. use a white-box integration for the
cooperation between k-induction and the invariant generator, build-
ing hardly wired connections between both analyses and sharing
the information inside the tool. Thus, integrating external tools is
hard to achieve. Moreover, the approach is designed to work for
k-induction only. Note that an analogeous approach is proposed by
Brain et al. [17].
Pauck and Wehrheim proposed CoDiDroid, a framework for
cooperative taint flow analysis for Android apps [39]. Within their
framework, different analysis tools with specialized capabilities are
combined as black-boxes. CoDiDroid is however tailored to the
needs of Android taint flow analysis, thus the exchanged informa-
tion differs. Thus CoDiDroid is not able to orchestrate or exchange
information on safety analysis with shared invariant generation.
To summarize, there are a lot of existing approaches for coopera-
tive verification, but most of them are white-box combinations, and
the only existing black-box combinations are not general enough
to allows for collective invariant generation.
7 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented a novel form of black box cooper-
ation for software verification via collective invariant generation.
Within the configurable framework named CoVerCIG, the so called
master verifier steering the verification process is able to delegate
the task of invariant generation to one or several helper invariant
generators.
Cooperative Verification via Collective Invariant Generation
We implemented CoVerCIG within the CPAchecker framework
using k-induction and predicate abstraction as master analysis sup-
ported by three existing helpers SeaHorn, UltimateAutomizer
andVeriAbs. Our evaluation on a set of SV-COMP verification tasks
shows that CoVerCIG increases the number of correctly solved tasks
without increasing the overall verification time. The best combi-
nation of helpers, UltimateAutomizer and VeriAbs in parallel,
yields an increase of 12% for k-induction and 17% for predicate
abstraction.
Next, we plan to enhance the cooperation by analyzing the be-
havior of the master in order to identify an optimal point to request
for help. Moreover, extending CoVerCIG by additionally taking
error traces found by the helper into account is also scheduled. In
addition, we intend to investigate whether a selection of helpers
on the basis of the given verification task is beneficial.
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